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JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM 2.0
Tamar R. Birckhead
ABSTRACT
Before the 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, the United States Supreme Court’s exercise of
judicial review did not support the notion that
constitutional litigation could be an effective instrument
of social reform. The Court’s principled rejection of
racially segregated public education, however, gave new
legitimacy to the concept of judicial review, transforming
it from an obstacle into a principal means of achieving
social progress. Since then, federal courts have impacted
public policy in many areas—from housing, welfare, and
transportation, to mental health institutions, prisons, and
juvenile courts. Yet, there are inherent structural
challenges to effecting institutional change through
litigation: courts are themselves passive institutions that
respond slowly to new information; they are oriented
toward past events and circumstances rather than the
possibilities implicit in future ones; and they graft
qualifications onto preexisting law rather than engaging
in a fresh consideration of the issues. In his major work,
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The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change?, Professor Gerald Rosenberg persuasively
argued that in order to overcome these constraints in a
particular case or controversy, certain key elements must
be present: incentives for the institution to change; costs
to the institution for not changing; the existence of
parallel institutions to help implement the change; and
the use of court orders to leverage additional resources
to bring about the change or to serve as a cover for
administrators who are willing to act but fear political
repercussions.
For more than sixty years after the founding of the
first juvenile court in 1899, its philosophy and guiding
principle were based on the rehabilitative ideal. This
model rejected the traditional adversary system found in
criminal court proceedings in favor of informal
procedures, indeterminate sanctions, judicial discretion,
and individualization. The 1967 Supreme Court case of In
re Gault struck at the core assumptions of this paradigm
with its emphasis on the functional similarity between
juvenile and adult criminal courts and extension of key
due process protections to youth charged in delinquency
court, including the right to counsel and the privilege
against self-incrimination. As revolutionary as the Gault
decision was, however, its holding failed to translate into
long-term sustainable reform—the result, at least in part,
of the absence of the requisite factors articulated by
Professor Rosenberg. Whether the recent Supreme Court
cases of Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, J.D.B.
v. North Carolina and their progeny will facilitate such
reform remains an open question.
This Article, written for a symposium at Brooklyn
Law School, Adolescents in Society: Their Evolving
Legal Status, explores the potential for twenty-first
century Supreme Court decisions implicating juveniles’
constitutional rights to transform the way in which the
courts process and punish young offenders. It discusses
the method and means by which institutional reform
litigation brings about change and the structural
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challenges that arise when courts attempt to transform
complex institutions. It provides a brief review of
Supreme Court decisions prior to Brown that served to
prevent rather than enable social change in the areas of
slavery, racial segregation, and workers’ rights; it
contrasts these cases with the decision and impact of
Brown. It argues that although In re Gault was a
foundational legal holding, it did not translate into
effective policy due in part to local officials’ failure to
implement the decision as expected and lawmakers’
inability to enact legislation that was true to the spirit of
Gault. The Article argues that based on the analysis
developed by Professor Rosenberg, recent Supreme Court
decisions ending the juvenile death penalty and juvenile
life without parole (JLWOP) sentences for non-homicides,
and holding that a child’s age properly informs the
Miranda custody analysis, could lead to significant
change in both the juvenile and criminal justice systems
for young offenders. It acknowledges the limitations of
this theory and the challenges that are likely to arise, and
concludes that, although courts can reform complex
institutions, constitutional litigation is an unreliable path
to social change.
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I. INTRODUCTION
From the perspective of many juvenile justice advocates, the
Supreme Court decision in Roper v. Simmons1 was a long time
coming. Simmons, which held in 2005 that imposing the death
penalty on juvenile offenders violated the Eighth Amendment,2
was the first Supreme Court decision in decades to acknowledge
the significance of the differences between minors and adults in
the context of criminal justice.3 Five years later, Graham v.
Florida,4 which held that life without parole sentences for non5
homicides were unconstitutional for juveniles, provided
advocates with further reason to hope for an overhaul of the way
in which the criminal and juvenile courts process and punish
young offenders.6 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, decided by the
7
Court in 2011, was perceived as extending this trajectory with
its holding that courts must consider the youth of the suspect
when determining whether questioning had been custodial and,
therefore, that Miranda warnings should have been given.8
1

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Id. at 575.
3
See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for Youth Law, Victory for
N.Y.C.L. and Other Youth Advocates on Juvenile Death Penalty Ban (Mar.
2, 2005), available at http://www.youthlaw.org/press_room/press_releases/
2005/juv_deathpenalty_ban/ (“The Court’s decision is a much-needed
reminder that children are different from adults in terms of judgment and
maturity, and are, therefore, less culpable . . . . [and w]e need a juvenile
justice system that reflects those differences.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
4
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
5
Id. at 2034.
6
See, e.g., Decision Called a “Significant Victory for Children,” EQUAL
JUST. INITIATIVE (May 17, 2010), http://www.eji.org/eji/node/393 (“It’s an
important win not only for kids who have been condemned to die in prison
but for all children who need additional protection and recognition in the
criminal justice system.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
7
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
8
Id. at 2406; John Kelly, Supreme Court Gives Juveniles Protection in
Police Interrogations, YOUTH TODAY (June 16, 2011), http://www.youth
today.org/view_article.cfm?article_id=4846 (“The case, J.D.B. v. North
Carolina[,] is the latest in a string of cases in which the high court has
applied protection to certain groups of juveniles.”).
2
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Each of these decisions has been hailed as “landmark,”9 and
together they have raised expectations among scholars,
advocates, and practitioners that a new era of reform may be
emerging for young offenders.10 In fact, such enthusiasm over a
Supreme Court opinion on the rights of juveniles has not been
expressed since In re Gault,11 the 1967 case establishing that
youth in delinquency court have basic due process rights,
including the Sixth Amendment rights of notice, counsel, and
confrontation, and the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.12 An unanswered question is whether these
twenty-first century litigation victories will fundamentally alter
the nature of juvenile justice policy or ultimately fail to bring
about sustainable reform, a charge that has been leveled at the
Gault decision itself.13
9

See, e.g., Scott Hechinger, Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP): An
Antidote to Congress’s One-Way Criminal Law Rachet?, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 408, 410 (2011) (referencing Graham); see also Jeffrey
Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2007), http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/03/11/magazine/11Neurolaw.t.html (describing Simmons);
Press Release, Juvenile Law Ctr., Landmark U.S. Supreme Court Decision
Protects Miranda Rights for Youth (June 16, 2011), available at
http://www.jlc.org/images/uploads/Press_Release_JDB_
Supreme_Court_Decision.pdf (referencing J.D.B.).
10
See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 8 (“[J.D.B.] represents the court’s settled
commitment to its view that kids are different . . . . It’s just a further shoring
up of that direction they’ve been moving in for [the] last several years.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
11
Sidney E. Zion, Court Ruling on Juveniles Is Hailed as Ending Unfair
Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1967, at A31 (“What this case means in its
most dramatic terms is that for 68 years we’ve been putting youngsters into
juvenile institutions by procedures which we now learn have been
unconstitutional . . . .”); see also Fred P. Graham, High Court Rules Adult
Code Holds in Juvenile Trials, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1967, at A1 (“The
landmark [Gault] decision is expected to require that radical changes be made
immediately in most of the nation’s 3,000 juvenile courts.”).
12
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41, 56–57 (1967).
13
See, e.g., Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 39, 41–43 (2003) (“In failing to consider what procedural
adaptations were demanded by the special context of juvenile court, Gault
reduced the analysis of children’s due process rights to the simple-minded
question of adult rights or no rights. And in the many cases considering
accused juveniles’ due process rights since Gault, the Court has adhered to
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This Article, written for a symposium at Brooklyn Law
School on “Adolescents in Society: Their Evolving Legal
Status,” explores the contours and nuances of this question. Part
II discusses the method and means by which institutional reform
litigation is designed to bring about change and the structural
challenges that arise when courts attempt to transform complex
institutions. It provides a brief review of late nineteenth century
Supreme Court decisions that served to prevent rather than
enable social change in the areas of slavery, racial segregation,
and workers’ rights. Part II then contrasts these cases with the
decision and impact of Brown v. Board of Education, in which
the Court rejected racially segregated public schools, giving new
legitimacy to the concept of judicial review.14 Part III argues
that, although Gault was a foundational legal holding, it did not
translate into effective policy due in part to the failures of local
officials to implement the decision as intended and lawmakers to
enact legislation that was true to its spirit. Part IV argues that,
15
based on the analysis established by Gerald Rosenberg,
Simmons and its progeny have the potential to catalyze
significant change for young offenders in both the juvenile and
criminal justice systems. Part V acknowledges the limitations to
this theory and the challenges that are likely to arise and
concludes that although courts can reform complex institutions,
constitutional litigation is an “unreliable path to social change.”16
II. WHAT IS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION?
Using the frame of “institutional reform litigation”17 to
this narrow and nonsensical framing.”).
14
See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
supplemented by 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II),
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
15
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 32–36 (2d ed. 2008); see also CHRISTOPHER P.
MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 10 (1998) (stating that
courts can become generators of social reform when certain conditions are met).
16
MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 10.
17
This type of litigation is also frequently referred to by other terms,
such as “structural reform litigation,” “constitutional reform litigation,”

22
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examine whether Supreme Court decisions can bring about longterm, sustainable reform of the juvenile courts may not be a
perfect fit.18 Although juvenile courts may be broadly defined as
“institutions,” they are not institutions in quite the same sense as
the entities and public organizations considered the traditional
objects of this type of litigation—school districts, state prisons,
and mental health hospitals.19 Nonetheless, given the emphasis
advocates and interest groups since In re Gault have placed on
using constitutional litigation to bring about change in the
juvenile courts, and the failure of both lawmakers and
bureaucrats to alter the fundamental nature of the system, it is
conceptually useful to analyze the strategy through this lens.
Further, it may be argued that the project of court-ordered reform
of a legal system is ideally positioned for success, as judges
presumably have a level of expertise in this area that they lack in
other settings.20 It may also be said, however, that appellate court
judges—particularly members of the Supreme Court—have limited
appreciation for the day-to-day functioning of the juvenile court
system21 or understanding of children and adolescents.22
“impact litigation,” “cause litigation,” and “public law litigation.”
18
See Stephen L. Wasby, The Supreme Court and Juvenile Justice, by
Christopher P. Manfredi, 8 LAW & POL. BOOK REV. 32, 33–34 (1998) (book
review), available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews
/manfredi.htm; see also Emily N. Winfield, Judicial Policymaking and
Juvenile Detention Reform: A Case Study of Jimmy Doe et al. v. Cook
County, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 225, 238–39 (2008) (“Courts are rarely
equipped to engage in the sort of long-term monitoring required to bring
about systemic reform.”).
19
Wasby, supra note 18, at 33.
20
See MANFREDI, supra note 15, at xi; see also DONALD T. KRAMER,
Post-Gault Reforms and Trends: The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 21:5 (2d ed. 2010) (stating
that juvenile justice litigation is “proving to be a most effective means of
advocacy as well as a catalyst for legislative reform and citizen
mobilization”).
21
See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547, 550–51
(1971) (holding that juveniles do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial,
that juvenile court judges can be as objective fact-finders as jurors, and that
“[i]f the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be
superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its
separate existence”).
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This Part begins the analysis by setting out the nature and
process of constitutional reform litigation, the inherent
challenges faced by courts that assume this role, and the key
factors needed in a case or controversy to overcome these
constraints. It then briefly examines the shift in the Supreme
Court’s exercise of judicial review after Brown v. Board of
Education, transforming the concept from a major obstacle to
social progress to a “principal means” of achieving it, and
catalyzing a trend that included reform of the juvenile courts.23
A. A Systemic Approach
The general objective of institutional reform litigation is to
“modify the framework of procedural and substantive rules
24
according to which social and political institutions operate.”
Through the process of judicial review, courts utilize primary
rights—such as the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses—to
“acquire and mobilize” secondary rights—such as the right to
racially integrated school districts or the right to representation
by counsel at juvenile delinquency hearings.25 They invoke these
rights to impact the way in which an institution functions,
generating remedial decrees or policy directives from the court

22

See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2416 (2011)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[F]urther problems are likely to emerge as judges
attempt to put themselves in the shoes of the average 16-year-old. . . . Fortyfive years of personal experience and societal change separate this judge from
the days when he or she was 15 years old. And this judge may or may not
have been an average 15-year-old.”).
23
MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 1.
24
Id. at 2.
25
Id. at 2–3. See generally MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG
RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18–42, 111–57 (2008) (comparing “strong” judicial
review, in which judicial interpretations of the constitution prevail over
legislative interpretations, with “weak” judicial review, which enables
legislative interpretations of the constitution to operate alongside judicial
interpretations, and arguing that weak review may lessen the strain that
strong review places on the democratic principle of majority rule).
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to the institution as the principal means of effecting change.26 In
this way, courts address an issue by adopting an aggressive role
as enforcers of the constitutional rights of individuals.27 They
order the expenditure of funds necessary to protect the right at
stake and create oversight mechanisms to ensure the continued
implementation of their remedies.28
Much has been written regarding the phases of institutional
reform litigation, with Phillip Cooper’s scholarship being among
the most consistently cited.29 Cooper describes the process as
occurring in four basic stages: the “triggering” event, policy or
practice; the finding of liability during the litigation; the
development of a remedy, in which the judge serves the roles of
facilitator, negotiator, and ultimate ratifier of the remedial
decree; and the post-decree phase when the parties may return to
30
the judge to request changes in the implementation process.
Cooper’s extensive research reveals that the majority of remedial
decree cases are not planned but reactive—and thus
unpredictable—in nature, triggered by anything from a riot to a
frustrated tenant to a lawyer determined to right a wrong that
she read about online.31 Once the matter finds its way into court,
the case is likely to expand from a single issue into a set of
issues that had been “lying out there waiting for a trigger.”32
The development of the litigation phase is determined largely by
the skill of the lawyer involved, whose ability to establish an
26

MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 2–3.
Id. at 2. But see E-mail from Kathryn Sabbeth, Assistant Professor of
Law, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill Sch. of Law, to author (June 26, 2011)
(on file with author) (suggesting that the attorney representing the plaintiff, as
the private attorney general, is the enforcer of the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights in a greater sense than the court).
28
See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY
6–7 (1977).
29
See, e.g., ROBERT COLDWELL WOOD & CLEMENT E. VOSE, REMEDIAL
LAW: WHEN COURTS BECOME ADMINISTRATORS 32 (1990); Susan Poser,
What’s a Judge to Do? Remedying the Remedy in Institutional Reform
Litigation, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1307, 1310–11, 1314, 1325 (2004).
30
PHILLIP J. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES: FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURT JUDGES AND STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS 16–24, 328–50 (1988).
31
WOOD & VOSE, supra note 29, at 32.
32
Id. at 33.
27
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adequate record affects the availability of potential remedies.33
The lawyer must make strategic decisions when defining the
issues to be presented, taking into consideration such factors as
convenience and litigation costs. Lawyers for public interest
organizations with affiliated membership groups may be
influenced by the pre-established priorities of their members and
the lawyers’ understanding of how best to prioritize the
divergent interests of a loosely-defined population whose
interests they must represent.34 Cooper has identified three
approaches to the post-decree or implementation phase that are
based on the degree to which a judge “trusts” and is willing to
defer to a target agency: a judge may directly oversee
compliance, leaving the details of the way in which goals are
met to the organization itself; parties may enter into a consent
decree or mutually agreeable, legally binding plan or process; or
a judge may place the agency in receivership, substituting its
administration for the current one.35 Given the number of
variables necessary to generate litigation that results in a remedy
with which the target institution complies, it is hardly surprising
when courts fall short of achieving their goals.
1. Inherent Challenges
The social science literature on institutional reform litigation
is dominated by work that emphasizes the inability of courts to
bring about meaningful social change, with perhaps the most
36
influential studies conducted by Gerald Rosenberg and Donald
37
Horowitz. These scholars and others have described the
multiple ways in which courts are structurally ill-suited for the
project. The “bounded nature of constitutional rights” prevents
33

COOPER, supra note 30, at 343; WOOD & VOSE, supra note 29, at 33.
See Sabbeth, supra note 27, at 1; see also RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE
LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 13 (2007) (“My goal . . . is to highlight the
consequences of [civil rights] lawyers’ strategic litigation choices about which
cases to pursue and which to avoid, which harms to emphasize and which to
ignore, [and] which constituencies to address and which to disregard.”).
35
WOOD & VOSE, supra note 29, at 36–37.
36
See ROSENBERG, supra note 15, at 35.
37
See HOROWITZ, supra note 28.
34
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courts from hearing many types of claims; precedent and culture
prevent judges from recognizing new rights; and courts often
decide issues on technical bases, lessening the “chances of
popular mobilization.”38 Scholars have also highlighted the fact
that courts are passive institutions that must wait for others to
bring claims and raise issues. The resulting pool of available
cases may not accurately reflect or represent the general impact
39
of the policies under review. Further, unlike legislatures,
courts typically focus on past events, speaking the language of
“rights” and “remedies,” rather than on the future impact of
their decisions or the costs and benefits of taking different
courses of action.40 Courts are thereby forced to graft
qualifications onto new decisions rather than to consider issues
de novo. A narrow focus on the anomalies of individual cases
41
makes it difficult, at best, to fashion systemic remedies. With
the current economic downturn, conditions have become even
more challenging, as U.S. courts grapple with budget crises that
can either limit or completely quash proposals for reform.42
In recent years, major constitutional law scholars such as
Ran Hirschl and Mark Tushnet have enriched this classic
literature with comparative work on the politics of
constitutionalism and judicial review and the allocation of social
and economic rights. For instance, through in-depth case studies
on constitutional reforms in Canada, New Zealand, Israel, and
South Africa, Hirschl has demonstrated that elected officials
initiate legal reform and delegate political power to the courts
not to protect minority groups from the tyranny of majority rule,
but as a means of preserving their own interests.43 Meanwhile,
Tushnet has addressed the conventional view that social welfare
38

ROSENBERG, supra note 15, at 10–13.
MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 9–10; see also ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 175 (1978).
40
MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 9.
41
HOROWITZ, supra note 28, at 35–38.
42
See, e.g., Ronald M. George, Challenges Facing an Independent
Judiciary, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1345, 1352 (2005) (discussing the need for
legislative funding as a means of reinforcing judicial legitimacy).
43
RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 149–210 (2004).
39
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rights do not belong in constitutions because courts cannot
enforce them.44 Using empirical studies of courts in Ireland,
South Africa, and the United States, he challenged the
assumption that judicial enforcement of social and economic
rights must take the form of coercive orders to the political
branches by suggesting that courts exercise weaker forms of
remedies to enforce these rights.45
Not all scholars share Horowitz’s approach to the question of
whether courts are equipped or designed to bring about social
change. Some have challenged the seemingly single-minded
focus on the shortcomings of judges and courts during the
adjudicative process, asserting that the decision-making
processes of legislators and administrators can be equally
ineffectual.46 Others have suggested that court-based systemic
reform can divert activists from pursuing the avenues of
legislative and political reform, which historically have been
more successful than judicial rulemaking in effecting change.47
Conservative scholars have characterized judicial oversight of
schools, prisons, and other state institutions as “intervention
[that] conflicts with democratic principles,” asserting, inter alia,
that it grounds social policy on “atypical situations and the evershifting judgments of experts.”48 Such critics have contended that
Congress should “narrow the concept of standing, the
availability of class actions, and provisions for declaratory and
injunctive relief.”49 In contrast, progressive scholars have
warned that because the legal system favors those of means and
because courts are either unwilling or unable to address
fundamental economic and social inequality, the remedies

44

TUSHNET, supra note 25, at 196–264.
Id. at 228.
46
See, e.g., Wasby, supra note 18, at 35.
47
See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM
THE COURTS 185–94 (1999).
48
Tinsley E. Yarbrough, The Political World of Federal Judges as
Managers, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 660, 660 (1985) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
49
Id. (citing Gary L. McDowell, A Modest Remedy for Judicial
Activism, PUB. INT., Spring 1982, at 3).
45
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imposed through litigation are likely to be modest.50 This point is
likely to be particularly salient in the context of constitutional—
as opposed to statutory—litigation, in which the poor have not
been recognized as a protected class, and the Constitution has
not been found to support a right to equal access to social
resources.51 Similarly, it has been observed that impact litigation
“unleashes legal, political, and social forces over which the
initiators of institutional reform litigation have little control,”
highlighting the difficulty of managing the direction and speed of
systemic reform.52
While the assertion that there is no silver bullet for policy
reform is undoubtedly true, there is value in closely examining
the efficacy of litigation, as it has been one of the principle
means of bringing about change in the United States since the
53
mid-twentieth century. Given the ongoing focus of liberal
reformers on impact litigation (and its increasing use by
conservatives as well),54 it is critical that scholars continue to
analyze why certain structural reform cases succeed while others
do not.
2. Necessary Factors
With his 1991 work (and its 2008 second edition), The
Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, Gerald
Rosenberg persuasively argued that in order for courts to
50

See, e.g., SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL
SERVICES PROGRAM AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 148–59 (1990);
Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 150 (1974); Wendy
Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and
Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 175, 175 (1982).
51
See Sabbeth, supra note 27, at 1.
52
MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 199.
53
ROSENBERG, supra note 15, at 430.
54
See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT 15–16, 148–53
(1985); ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING
THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION 8–40 (2008) (tracing how conservative and
libertarian lawyers have created dozens of public interest organizations
modeled on those of the political left and demonstrating how these groups
have succeeded in shaping law and public policy).
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overcome structural constraints, certain key elements must be
present in a particular case or controversy: incentives for the
institution to change; costs to the institution for not changing;
the existence of parallel institutions to help implement the
change; and the use of court orders to leverage additional
resources to effectuate change or to serve as a cover for
administrators who are willing to act but fear political
repercussions.55
Although each case presents its own specific circumstances
and hurdles, the terms used share certain commonalities.
“Incentives” typically refer to rewards for successful
implementation of reform proposals, which most often take the
form of federal funding or other monetary benefits.56 “Costs”
generally mean the loss of money, either public or private,
resulting from legislative or administrative action taken when the
key actors fail to implement a particular decision.57 When
individuals or groups are willing and able to create their own
institutions, rather than relying on existing ones to act, courts
can bring about social change through markets—although this
avenue is only possible when a realistic market alternative exists
58
and when courts allow market forces to act. The use of court
orders and consent decrees can be effective for securing
increased funding from the legislature; they can also be used to
gain the cooperation of staff members, community members,
and politicians who are otherwise resistant to reform.59 Thus,
Rosenberg’s model calls for the presence of sufficient precedent;
executive and legislative support; low-level public support or
limited public opposition; and either positive incentives to induce
compliance, costs to induce compliance, the possibility of
market implementation, or key administrators who desire change
60
or for whom the court provides leverage or cover.
Although Rosenberg’s analysis has not been without its
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detractors,61 his framework setting out the factors necessary for
successful court-driven reform and his ultimate conclusion that
American courts are relatively weak and ineffectual have
become a touchstone for subsequent scholarship in this area.62
B. The Role of the Supreme Court
During the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court issued
a series of decisions that served to prevent rather than enable
social change in such areas as slavery, racial segregation, and
workers’ rights. By the 1930s, the NAACP had organized a
broad program of legal attacks on racial segregation aimed at the
“most blatant inequalities in school facilities and teacher
salaries.”63 During the 1940s and early 1950s, Department of
Justice lawyers in the Civil Rights Division addressed the laborbased and economic harms of the Jim Crow system.64 With its
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court dramatically
shifted the paradigm. Civil rights doctrine post-Brown has
primarily addressed policies of classification based on personal
characteristics, such as race, gender, and national origin, and
65
the “stigmatic harm” of such governmental classifications. This
Section contrasts the Supreme Court cases that preceded Brown
with the federal circuit court cases that followed it, suggesting
61
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that Brown served as a “crystallizing moment that channeled
legal energy toward some kinds of cases and legal theories
rather than others.”66
1. Judicial Review Pre-1950s
Prior to the 1950s, the Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial
review did not support the notion that constitutional litigation
could be an effective instrument of progressive social reform.67
There are numerous examples of late nineteenth- and earlytwentieth century cases that substantiate this view, with perhaps
the most notable being major decisions in the areas of slavery,
civil rights, economic regulation, and child labor.68 During this
period, the Court upheld the right to make and enforce
contracts, the right to property, and the right to liberty afforded
to employers and employees. For instance, in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, the Court allowed slavery to expand into the federal
territories when it held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause protected the property rights of slave owners.69 In the
1883 Civil Rights Cases, the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause protected against racial
discrimination committed only by governments, not by private
individuals and organizations.70 In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court
71
upheld state-mandated racial segregation on intrastate railroads.
In Lochner v. New York, the Court invalidated a New York
statute forbidding bakers from working more than sixty hours
per week.72 In both 1918 and 1935, the Court declared
66
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congressional attempts to regulate exploitative child labor
practices unconstitutional.73 As a result of such opinions,
constitutional litigation became a principle means of maintaining
the status quo.74
Several studies on the role of the judicial branch during this
period further illustrate its expanding scope and impact.75 Arnold
Paul has found that because post-Civil War era social protests
were perceived as placing property interests at risk, arguably
necessitating judicial involvement, the courts assumed increased
importance.76 By the mid-1890s, the judiciary “emerged . . . as
the principal bulwark of conservative defense,” with the
Supreme Court consistently striking down legislative attempts at
economic regulation.77 Meanwhile, legal progressives who
supported such regulation were critical of the Court, asserting
that it was antidemocratic and acting against the people’s will.78
As the work of Paul and other scholars demonstrates, the
relationship among the legal doctrines, court decisions, and
attitudes of lawyers and judges of that era shifted as social
tensions grew and evolved.
2. Brown v. Board of Education
With Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court’s
rejection of racial segregation in public education gave new
legitimacy to the concept of judicial review, transforming it
from an obstacle into a principal means of achieving social
progress.79 Holding that the policy of “separate but equal”
violated the Fourteenth Amendment, “Brown overturned nearly
73
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sixty years of Court-sanctioned segregation.”80 The decision has
81
been said to have “buried Jim Crow,” and to have “served as
the . . . ideological engine” of the civil rights movement.82 For
nearly six decades it has been considered the “principal
83
inspiration to others who seek change through litigation” and
the “symbol” of the Court’s ability to generate social change.84
There are, however, critics of this view. Michael Klarman, for
instance, has asserted “that Brown was directly responsible for only
the most token forms of southern public school desegregation.”85
Relying on a variety of secondary sources, Klarman established
that nearly a decade after Brown, the number of children attending
desegregated schools had not measurably increased.86 He illustrated
further that it was only after the 1964 Civil Rights Act threatened
to cut federal funding to southern school districts that the numbers
87
began to shift. As a result, Brown did not bring about change by
stirring northern whites into action or by raising the expectations of
southern blacks, but did so indirectly by spurring white
segregationists to suppress civil rights demonstrations violently,
which in turn led to national demands for civil rights legislation.88
Michael Seidman has argued that Brown merely reinforced the
fiction that desegregation brought an end to all racial barriers,
enabling white society to blame blacks for their continued poverty
and disempowerment, a status that “was now no longer a result of
80
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the denial of equality . . . . [but] marked a personal failure to take
advantage of one’s definitionally equal status.”89 Observing that the
quality of public education for many minority children has
decreased and that levels of racial segregation in city schools
remain high decades after Brown,90 Derrick Bell has suggested that
the civil rights lawyers who litigated Brown were more committed
to their belief in racial integration than to the educational interests
of their clients.91 In writing that Brown failed to “reform[] the
ideology of racial domination that Plessy v. Ferguson
represented,”92 Bell has provocatively argued that if the Court in
Brown had upheld the doctrine of “separate but equal,” the civil
rights loss may have ultimately opened up “opportunities for
effective schooling capable of turning constitutional defeat into a
major educational victory.”93 Meanwhile, Cooper and other
scholars have observed that while Brown was a legal success, it
was neither a typical nor an ideal impact litigation case. Instead, it
resulted from “careful planning, control, and coordination” by
well-established civil rights lawyers who utilized a precise and
coherent strategy, factors not often present in these types of cases.94
89
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Regardless of the exact chain of causation linking Brown to
the end of segregation, the decision continues to represent an
instance in which a court acting in tandem with the legislative
and
executive
branches
produced
significant
social
reformindirectly if not directly.
3. Federal Courts Post-Brown
In the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, federal courts
took steps to reform public policy in a variety of areas. For
instance, mandatory bus transportation was ordered to
implement desegregation in North Carolina public schools.95
Likewise, providing inadequate medical treatment to patients
confined at state mental hospitals in Alabama was found to be
96
unconstitutional. Yet, litigation victories for plaintiffs have
been consistently followed by push-back from other
constituencies. One example is prison reform, which is premised
on the claim that prison conditions violate the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Following
several successful litigation campaigns in this area,97 Congress
98
passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which placed
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rigorous procedural requirements on judicial orders and
mandated that remedies be directed only at constitutional
violations.99 Although Congress adopted a statute allowing
prevailing parties in federal court to collect attorneys’ fees in
100
constitutional challenges to the actions of government officials,
the statute had “some downsides,” including the diversion of
resources from precedential but risky cases to those in which
success was more likely and could, therefore, cover the
expenses of litigation.101 The PLRA further limited attorneys’
fees by significantly lowering the reimbursement rate to that
earned by lawyers appointed to represent federal indigent
defendants.102 Despite the adverse reactions to Brown, however,
the decision did catalyze numerous organizations and individuals
to bring types of actions that had rarely been pursued before.103
Reform of the juvenile courts was an important part of this postBrown trend, with In re Gault having the broadest impact.
III. WHY GAULT FAILED
In 2007, juvenile justice advocates, scholars, and
practitioners celebrated the fortieth anniversary of In re Gault.104
The decision was lauded as having ushered in the modern
juvenile court, one in which youth receive many of the same due
process rights as adult criminal defendants, including the right to
counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination.105 Yet, it has
also been acknowledged that the victory was bittersweet, for in
99
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many of today’s juvenile courtrooms, youth regularly waive
their right to legal counsel, are adjudicated delinquent despite a
lack of sufficient evidence, and are sentenced to serve terms in
facilities that are little more than warehouses for our
communities’ poor children of color.106 The examination of why
Gault failed, therefore, is a vitally important one, particularly in
light of recent Supreme Court cases brought on behalf of
juveniles.
A. Juvenile Justice Policy Pre-Gault
Before 1899, criminal suspects and offenders under the age
of eighteen were treated no differently than their adult
counterparts and were subject to the same procedures and
penalties, resulting in high rates of recidivism.107 In Chicago, for
instance, children as young as seven were arrested for petty theft
and detained with adult offenders until the next court session,
prompting the Chicago Herald to report, “[t]here are no
healthful influences brought to bear on these youthful offenders,
neither physically nor morally . . . . It is not a house of
correction with them—it is a house of perversion, corruption and
retrogression for them.”108 The 1893 article concluded by
asserting that “these boys were really more sinned against than
sinning,” echoing the views of lawyers and judges who held the
city itself responsible for a justice system that “manufactured
criminals.”109
The juvenile court movement developed in reaction to the
punitive treatment of young offenders by the criminal courts as
well as the perception that the family unit had failed to supervise
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its children.110 Greater numbers of women were working outside
the home during the Progressive Period of the late nineteenth
century and forced to balance the competing obligations of
employment and child supervision.111 While institutional care for
poor families in alms houses and asylums had been a popular
policy, “the public became increasingly unwilling to mix
children with other paupers and demanded the creation of
112
separate orphanages for children.” The juvenile court emerged
during this period, which was characterized by anxiety over the
“social decline” of urban life, optimism that solutions could be
found by skilled professionals, and a strong belief that criminal
behavior was caused by the failure of nurture, not nature.113
Reformers focused on environmental causes of delinquency,
asserting that children must be properly socialized against
corruption; they deemphasized the importance of specific
114
misconduct in favor of evaluating the whole child, an example
of “substantive” rather than “legal” justice.115 The belief that the
juvenile court must serve as a substitute for parents when they
110
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neglect to follow through on their responsibilities formed the
basis for the doctrine of parens patriae.116
During the first fifty years of the juvenile court’s
development, it had broad jurisdiction over all types of conduct
by and circumstances affecting children. State juvenile codes
contained expansive definitions of “neglect” and “delinquent”
and utilized catch-all phrases such as “incorrigible” and
“growing up in idleness or crime” to reach any disfavored
behavior that suggested parental failure.117 The court was run
informally and few procedural protections were afforded to
juveniles. The judge typically focused on reforming the child
rather than deterrence or retribution and on determining the
“truth” of what happened rather than strict adherence to the
rules of evidence.118 This approach often resulted in
indeterminate probationary or incarcerative dispositions that
relied on a judge’s subjective assessment of a child’s needs,
rather than the nature and seriousness of the offense
119
committed. It is not surprising, therefore, that this model led
to circumstances such as those faced by fifteen-year-old Gerald
Gault when he appeared in the Gila County juvenile court in
Arizona in 1964.
B. The Impact of Gault
In re Gault was the second in a trio of cases decided by the
Supreme Court between 1966 and 1970 that addressed the due
116
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process rights of juveniles. Gault was preceded by Kent v.
United States, which held that a juvenile cannot be transferred
from delinquency to adult criminal court without a “fair
hearing” in which the youth is represented by counsel who has
access to the client’s probation records.120 It was followed by In
re Winship, which held that the standard of proof in juvenile
court must be the same as that in adult criminal court—beyond a
reasonable doubt—and not the lesser preponderance of the
evidence standard.121 Together these cases reflected the view that
the system’s purpose is to assess whether a young person
committed a criminal offense, and that juvenile courts should be
concerned with what a child does, rather than who a child is.122
The facts of Gault provided an ideal forum for the Court to
review the progress and impact of juvenile court during its first
half century. Gerald Gault, who had previously been on
probation for being with a boy who stole a wallet, was
sentenced to up to six years in juvenile prison for making a
“lewd or indecent” phone call to a female neighbor, for which
the maximum penalty for an adult was only two months or a
fifty dollar fine.123 Gault’s parents had not been given meaningful
notice of the charges; he had no lawyer at the hearing; and he
was not advised of his right to remain silent.124 No record was
made; no witnesses were sworn; and no appeal was possible.125
Gault’s holding that basic due process rights apply to juvenile
delinquency proceedings—including the right to counsel, the
privilege against self-incrimination, and the opportunity for
cross-examination of witnesses—struck at the core assumptions
of a paradigm that had guided juvenile justice reform for
126
decades. By recognizing that “[u]nbridled discretion . . . is
frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure,” the
Court ruled that practices that had long been accepted and even
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encouraged under traditional juvenile court theory were
unconstitutional.127
Gault, however, was not a complete rejection of the juvenile
court model or of non-punitive responses to adolescent
misconduct. The Court’s decision acknowledged that there were
“substantive benefits” to the system that basic due process
protections would not “abandon or displace.”128 Finding that the
system had failed to reduce crime or rehabilitate offenders
effectively, the Court noted its regret that the juvenile court had
been unable to achieve its goals, but expressed confidence that
“the features of the juvenile system[,] which its proponents have
asserted are of unique benefit[,] will not be impaired by
constitutional domestication.”129
C. What Factors Were Missing?
Despite the Court’s assurance that the positive aspects of the
traditional juvenile court would not be lost with adherence to
due process standards, developments in juvenile justice policy
after Gault were the opposite of what the Court had predicted.130
In perhaps the largest study completed in the years immediately
following the decision, it was found that “failure to comply with
Gault’s rules was widespread,” resulting in “sometimes flagrant
131
disregard of constitutional rights.” Many juvenile court judges
believed that they were not bound by the requirements of Gault
as long as the adjudication of delinquency did not result in
incarceration of the child; others were unfamiliar with the
specifics of the decision.132 Local officials resisted implementing
rules of the Supreme Court, which they perceived as having
133
little enforcement power over them. States passed legislation
127
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that was designed to make the juvenile court system look more
like the adult criminal court system, but much was lost in the
translation.134 A “quid pro quo” attitude took effect in which
courts denied specific procedural protections to young offenders
out of a belief that juvenile court was rehabilitative rather than
punitive.135 Alternatively, some courts asserted that if too many
procedural rights were extended to juveniles, the “intimate,
informal, [and] protective” nature of delinquency court would be
lost.136
Applying the analytic framework developed by Rosenberg to
Gault, it is clear that very few of the key elements needed for
successful institutional reform litigation were present. There
were no incentives from outside actors that served to catalyze
change within the juvenile court. Equally important, there were
few incentives for the main participants within the system to
change, as most were invested in maintaining the informal
culture of the court. Juvenile defense attorneys, for instance,
lacked the inclination and commitment to assume a truly
adversarial role on behalf of young offenders and instead acted
as mediators.137 Judges were committed to the rehabilitative ideal
138
and were protective of their broad discretionary powers.
Likewise, there were no outside actors or parallel institutions
imposing costs for non-compliance.139 Because hearings were
either closed to or ignored by the public, there was little to no
oversight of the proceedings.140 Although Gault had some effect
on the work of state lawmakers, reform of juvenile codes
focused mainly on the decriminalization of status offenses such
134
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as incorrigibility, truancy, and running away, which formerly
had been punished in delinquency court.141 In these ways, the
implementation of Gault fell far short of its goals because the
Court “lack[ed] the tools to enforce its decree.”142
D. Juvenile Court Forty Years Later
Studies conducted two decades after Gault by Barry Feld and
others reported findings similar to the data collected immediately
following the decision: juvenile courts had continued to fail to
143
comply with the Court’s holding. During this period and well
into the 1990s, sanctions became increasingly punitive for young
offenders; the age cap on delinquency court jurisdiction was
lowered in some states and never raised in others, and the
percentage of juveniles transferred to adult criminal court
grew.144 In fact, in many states, there was no check on
141
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(1998), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/172836.pdf (finding that
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prosecutorial discretion regarding whom to charge, what to
charge, and whom to transfer from juvenile to adult court.145 In
most states, juveniles did not have the right to a jury trial, one
of the few protections against racial bias and discrimination by
prosecutors.146 Similarly, few states provided judicial oversight
of discretionary decisions made by police or juvenile probation
officers, decisions that impacted who entered the juvenile court
system and who remained there.147
Forty years after Gault, the juvenile justice system continues
to provide children with “the worst of both worlds.”148 There is
overwhelming evidence that juveniles receive substandard
representation, according to state assessments of the quality of
defense counsel conducted by the American Bar Association.149
There is a mixed record on rehabilitation of young offenders,
with empirical data showing that recidivism rates increase as a
result of juvenile court involvement150 and that exposure to the
juvenile justice system enhances the risk that youth will engage
in criminal activity as adults.151 Further, “disproportionate
minority contact,” the phenomenon in which children of color
JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 93
(1999),
available
at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/toc.html
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that
sanctions became more punitive for young offenders).
145
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146
Linda A. Szymanski, Juvenile Delinquents’ Right to a Jury Trial
(2007 Update), NCJJ SNAPSHOT (Nat’l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Pittsburgh,
Pa.), Feb. 2008, at 1, available at http://www.ncjj.org/PDF/Snapshots/2008
/Vol13_no2_righttojurytrial.pdf; see also Birckhead, supra note 135, at 1451.
147
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(2010).
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enter the juvenile justice system at a higher rate than their white
counterparts, is an entrenched problem, as confirmed by
statistics from the United States Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention.152
In short, the beneficial effects of Gault were temporary. The
victory was a largely symbolic one in which change was inspired
but not maintained.153 The case, therefore, stands as an example
of what happens when courts serve “an ideological function of
luring a movement for social reform to an institution that is
structurally constrained from serving its needs, providing only
154
an illusion of change.” Whether twenty-first century juvenile
justice litigation will confront the same fate remains to be seen.
IV. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY JUVENILE JUSTICE
LITIGATION
Between 1970 and 2005, there were few Supreme Court
decisions involving juvenile justice and even fewer that extended
the legacy of In re Gault. In fact, nearly all of the Court’s
opinions during this period served to curb Gault’s efforts to
bring standard criminal court processes to juvenile court.
Beginning in 1971, the Court held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania
that juvenile proceedings are not equivalent to criminal
prosecutions, and that the context-driven standard of
“fundamental fairness” does not require that an accused youth
has a right to a jury trial.155 Four years later in Breed v. Jones,
the Court decided that the double jeopardy clause prohibits
juvenile courts from conducting transfer hearings after
delinquency adjudication hearings, although in sharp contrast to
152
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the cynicism expressed in Gault, Kent v. United States, and In
re Winship, the Court took pains to portray the juvenile system
as largely beneficial to children.156 In 1975, in Goss v. Lopez,157
the Court held that students do not have the right to a formal
hearing before receiving a school suspension of fewer than ten
days. Three years later in Swisher v. Brady, the Court declined
to strike a state statute allowing the prosecutor to file exceptions
to a “not guilty” finding made by a master of the juvenile
court.158 In 1979, in Fare v. Michael C., the Court refused to
apply elements of Miranda v. Arizona to juvenile proceedings
when it held that a sixteen-year-old’s request to speak to his
probation officer was not the equivalent of an invocation of the
right to remain silent and to consult with an attorney.159 Michael
C., together with Goss and Swisher, gave new life to the
traditional view of juvenile court that had been discredited in
Gault.160 The 1984 case of Schall v. Martin furthered this trend
by allowing for preventative pretrial detention of accused
juveniles upon a finding of “serious risk” that they would
reoffend.161 The majority opinion in Schall, written by Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, is perhaps best known for justifying
institutional restraints on minors by the fact that “juveniles,
unlike adults, are always in some form of custody.”162 The
following year, the Rehnquist Court gave states even wider
latitude over the rights of youth when it held in New Jersey v.
T.L.O. that searches of students by school officials are not
subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment
163
and need only be justified by a reasonable cause standard.
It was not until 2005, nearly forty years after Gault, that the
156
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Supreme Court introduced a major shift in the perspective of the
legal system towards young people who commit crime. A discussion
of whether the Court’s decisions in Roper v. Simmons, Graham v.
Florida, and J.D.B. v. North Carolina have the potential to transform
the juvenile justice system on either the macro or micro level follows.
A. Eighth Amendment
In the two decades between T.L.O. and Simmons, the
Supreme Court addressed the rights of youth charged with
criminal offenses on only two occasions, both in the context of
the Eighth Amendment.164 In 1988, the Court prohibited the
death penalty for offenders who were fifteen and younger in
Thompson v. Oklahoma,165 only to uphold it the following year
166
for sixteen and seventeen-year-olds in Stanford v. Kentucky.
With its 2005 decision in Simmons, the Court held that as a
categorical matter, juveniles are not as culpable as adults and,
thus, are not deserving of capital punishment, overruling
Stanford.167 Citing sociological and scientific research, the Court
emphasized the differences between children and adults in such
areas as impulse control, susceptibility to peer pressure, and
character formation.168 While Simmons is clearly important from
the perspective of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the
decision also has potential ramifications for the juvenile justice
system at large.169 The majority’s recognition that age matters
and that it would be misguided from a “moral standpoint” to
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equate the failings of minors with those of adults has been and
will continue to influence other areas of doctrine and theory.170
Five years later, the Court relied on Simmons when it held,
in Graham v. Florida, that the Eighth Amendment does not
permit juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes to be
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole
(JLWOP).171 The Graham Court applied a form of Eighth
Amendment comparative analysis that previously had been
reserved only for capital cases, exempting an entire class of
offenders who had committed a range of crimes from JLWOP,
rather than balancing the gravity of the crime against the
severity of an individual sentence, as is typically done in termof-years cases.172 Relying on Simmons, the Court again invoked
social science research on adolescent behavior as well as neuroscientific data on brain development to support the view that
young offenders are incomplete works in progress for whom
redemption remains viable.173 Justice Anthony Kennedy, who
wrote the majority opinions in both Simmons and Graham, felt
strongly that courts must take age into account at all stages of
the criminal justice process. This view became central to the
court’s opinion in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, decided one year
after Graham.174
B. Fifth Amendment
In 2011, the Supreme Court held that a suspect’s age must
be a factor when determining whether police interrogation was
custodial, thereby requiring Miranda warnings.175 The Petitioner,
J.D.B., was a thirteen-year-old student who was questioned
about local break-ins by a uniformed police investigator in a
176
conference room at his middle school. The school resource
170
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officer, assistant principal, and administrative intern were also
present, although no one had attempted to reach J.D.B.’s
grandmother who was his legal guardian.177 The assistant
principal urged him to “do the right thing,” asserting that “the
178
truth always comes out in the end.” Without advising him that
he could refuse to speak with them and could have a lawyer
appointed, the police investigator warned J.D.B. that if he kept
breaking into houses, he could “get sent to juvenile detention
before court.”179 The North Carolina juvenile and appellate
courts found the boy’s youth to be irrelevant to the custody
analysis, and determined that the test of whether a suspect feels
“free to leave” during questioning was based only on
“objective” factors.180 J.D.B. represents the first time that the
Supreme Court has addressed this question directly,181 and it
relied on both Simmons and Graham to overrule the state
courts.182
C. Looking Ahead
Despite Gault’s failures of policy, the decision was the
culmination of a movement that was a legal success.183 The
holding that juveniles have a right to notice of charges against
them, representation by counsel, and cross-examination of state
witnesses triggered legislation that brought juvenile courts—for
better or worse—much closer to the criminal court model. In
turn, twenty-first century juvenile justice cases have prevailed,
at least in part, as a result of Gault.
In looking ahead, it is critical to identify the areas of juvenile
and criminal justice reform that are primed for future institutional
reform litigation in the wake of Simmons, Graham, and J.D.B. On
the macro level, potential areas of focus include cases that affirm
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the fundamental differences between adult and juvenile offenders,
call for qualitatively different treatment for the two groups, ensure
that “youth” is considered as mitigating and not aggravating, and
perform a signaling function that the juvenile and criminal courts’
treatment of young offenders is both serious and important.
On the micro level, recent precedent could support future
litigation directed at each stage of the investigative and
adjudicatory process. For instance, J.D.B. could lead to a
cultural shift in the approach of police officers towards young
suspects, in which age is taken into account during investigation,
interrogation, and detention.184 At the trial stage, Simmons and
Graham could support litigation that results in rigorous client—
centered representation for juveniles—whether in delinquency
court, transfer hearings, or criminal court. Such reform could
lead to elimination of the troubling practice of waiver of counsel
by juveniles.185 At the dispositional or sentencing stage, litigation
could mandate that prosecutors, judges, and probation officers
take into account the youth’s brain development, mental and
emotional state, making the process more uniformly appropriate
for juvenile offenders.
Simmons and Graham could also support future litigation that
removes the option of “benign detention” and long-term
warehousing of youth, thereby strengthening families through
providing rehabilitative treatment within the community.186 These
cases could be invoked to encourage system-wide recognition of
the positive aspects of the rehabilitative ideal and the capacity of
all young offenders to be redeemed. Further, these cases could
be used to narrow the circumstances under which transfer from
juvenile to criminal court is possible, as empirical data has
shown that minors tried as adults receive little or no
rehabilitation, are at greater risk of victimization in adult
facilities, and experience severe collateral consequences of
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criminal convictions.187 At the post-conviction stage, Graham has
mandated that young offenders sentenced to lengthy terms of
incarceration be offered a “meaningful opportunity” for release,
requiring prisons that house juveniles to provide young offenders
188
with the means to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation.
While it is unclear how this will translate into practice, as the
“mechanisms for compliance” have been left to the states, future
litigation could result in improved prison conditions for
juveniles.189
Thus, similar to the period post-Gault when reformers had
high expectations that the legal victory would translate into longterm policy change, there is optimism in the juvenile justice
field that the litigation successes of Simmons, Graham, and
J.D.B. will have a positive—if not transformative—effect upon
190
the juvenile and criminal court systems. Challenges, however,
are inevitable, illustrating once again that courts are constrained
in their ability to reform complex institutions.
V. LIMITATIONS & CHALLENGES
Perhaps the most significant legacy of In re Gault was the
Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that constitutional rights are
not limited to adults. The decision led to an increasing number
of constitutional challenges to federal and state laws and policies
brought on behalf of youth, which in turn has enlarged the role
of the federal courts in children’s lives.191 Yet, litigation
187
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implicating the rights and liberties of children can raise difficult
and highly charged questions about state authority over
disenfranchised youth. It can force states to intervene between
children and parents, challenge cultural norms regarding the role
of the child in the family, and catalyze turf wars over alreadylimited government funding.192 Although it is tempting to assume
a “glass half full” approach to the question of whether Roper v.
Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and J.D.B. v. North Carolina will
lead to more meaningful policy reform than did Gault, it is
essential to acknowledge what may be a harsh reality.
A. Back Steps & Caveats
Just as the successes of Kent v. United States, Gault, and In
re Winship were followed by decisions that reversed course (or,
as critics would say, that addressed the trio’s initial
overcorrection),193 Simmons, Graham, and J.D.B. could generate
a similar pattern. Future litigation relying on Simmons et al. will
inevitably challenge less severe sentencing practices and less
significant due process violations; as a result, the circumstances
of future plaintiffs will not be as compelling as those faced by
Christopher Simmons, Terrance Graham, or thirteen-year-old
J.D.B. The criminal justice system could then shift back—at
least temporarily—to a model that places more weight on the
harm committed by a young offender than the developmental
causes that mitigate culpability.
In addition, as this Article is framed by a comparison of the
effects of Gault with those of Simmons and its progeny, several
caveats are in order. First, there are basic differences between
Gault and the recent cases. As discussed, Gault paved the way
for delinquency court to shift from a rehabilitative model to a
retributive one that provides juveniles with many of the same
due process protections that adults receive in criminal court. The
litigation was a product, at least in part, of the new children’s
192
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rights movement of the 1960s.194 Although the Court in Gault
explicated the rights that should be afforded to juveniles charged
with crimes, it left open many questions, including whether the
due process rights to counsel and confrontation apply to other
adjudicatory stages of the proceeding, such as detention and
dispositional hearings.195 Gault did not define the specific role
and purpose of counsel for children in juvenile court, leaving
unsettled whether lawyers should represent the “expressed
interests” of their young clients or advocate for their “best
interests.”196 The decision did not address the matter of whether,
and under what circumstances, a juvenile may waive the right to
counsel.197 It also left the role of parents ambiguous.198 In
addition, Gault declined to find a right to a transcript, to appeal,
or to post-dispositional representation for juveniles.199
In contrast, neither Simmons nor its progeny resulted from
broad coalitions or movements determined to change the
institution of the juvenile court or the fundamental ways in
which the criminal and juvenile justice systems treat young
offenders. The lawyers and human rights activists supporting the
Simmons litigation were motivated as much or more by a
determination to end capital punishment as by a desire for
juvenile justice reform.200 Similarly, the Graham decision was
194
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viewed by many advocates as the first step in a broader
campaign to challenge all lengthy terms of incarceration.201
Likewise, J.D.B.’s appeal was initiated by local attorneys who
were incensed by the opinions in the courts of North Carolina,
not by organized children’s rights groups.202 Further, Simmons
and Graham each addressed relatively narrow (although
critically important) questions regarding sentencing practices,
and J.D.B. focused on a specific issue related to the provision of
Miranda warnings. While these recent cases also left open
questions, their holdings do not go to the heart of either the
juvenile or criminal justice system, making it particularly
difficult to predict whether they will facilitate broad reform.
B. Will History Repeat Itself?
In the wake of the legal successes of Simmons, Graham, and
J.D.B., lower federal courts, state courts, and legislatures have
issued holdings and passed laws that provide a glimpse of the
good news for opponents of capital punishment.”); Editorial, Too Young to
Die?, BRATTLEBORO REFORMER (Vt.), Oct. 13, 2004 (“If the high court
[rules for Simmons], it will be a landmark victory for child and human rights
advocates, but it will also be a win for death penalty opponents, who view
the possible ruling as one more way to curtail the law.”).
201
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ways in which these Supreme Court decisions could translate
into long-term sustainable policy. For instance, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals relied on Simmons to hold that a seventeenyear-old student’s murder confession was involuntary, based
upon the inadequacy of the Miranda warnings given and the
coercive nature of the police interrogation.203 A federal district
court found under Graham that mandatory twenty-five year
consecutive terms for a juvenile convicted of non-homicides
violated the Eighth Amendment, for the 307-year sentence
offered “no possibility of release based on demonstrated
204
maturity and rehabilitation.” A state appellate court found that
Graham’s reasoning prohibited a long term-of-years sentence for
a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide.205 Likewise, the
prosecution of teenagers in adult criminal courts has been widely
impacted by Simmons and Graham, as fifteen states have
changed their laws since 2005, with at least nine others actively
engaged in policy reform efforts.206 Specifically, the data shows
that three states have expanded juvenile court jurisdiction so that
youth who previously would have been automatically tried as
203
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adults are now prosecuted in juvenile court.207 Ten states have
revised their transfer laws, making it more likely that young
offenders will remain in the juvenile system instead of being
waived into criminal court.208 Four states have limited the
applicability of their mandatory minimum sentencing laws by
relying on the developmental differences between juveniles and
adults.209 In addition, four states have passed laws that reduce the
numbers of youth who can be housed in adult jails and
prisons.210 Advances have also been made in the approach to the
dispositional treatment of juvenile offenders, with one state’s
very successful system of small, therapeutic rehabilitation
centers being replicated throughout the United States.211 In fact,
detention policy reform has gained traction despite budgetary
constraints, as lawmakers, corrections officials, and agency
administrators have acknowledged that redirecting funds for
juvenile jails to community-based youth programs both lowers
recidivism rates and saves money.212
207
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Other recent state laws and court decisions reveal the
limitations of the impact of Simmons and its progeny. For instance,
one state court relied on Graham to hold that “sentencing a
juvenile to life without parole (LWOP) for a murder he helped
commit at age fourteen is not categorically unconstitutional.”213
Similarly, another court held that Graham does not apply to
juveniles who receive lengthy term-of-years sentences that result in
the functional equivalent of LWOP.214 Ten other state courts have
decided not to apply Graham to cases involving killings by
juveniles, and seven have opted not to apply it when juveniles were
accomplices to murder.215 In post-Graham attempted-murder cases,
although one state court ordered resentencing for a juvenile serving
LWOP because his conduct did not “result in death,” another
upheld the sentence.216 Litigation efforts to extend Graham to
sentences of life in prison with the possibility of parole have
generally been unsuccessful.217 Further, some lawmakers have been
unable to agree on new sentencing guidelines consistent with
Graham for juveniles convicted of non-homicide felonies.218 As a
result, legislative impasses have gone unresolved from one session
of a state’s general assembly to the next.219
news.com/articles/2011/05/16/md-youth-jail-be-scaled-back; David L. White,
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SUN (May 18, 2011), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/readers
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Richard Fausset, Conservatives Latch onto Prison Reform, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
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WISLAWJOURNAL.COM (May 20, 2011, 8:55 AM), http://wislawjournal.
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People v. Ramirez, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 155, 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011),
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It is useful to apply Rosenberg’s framework to Simmons,
Graham and J.D.B., and it allows for comparison with this
Article’s earlier analysis of Gault.220 In regard to whether
incentives exist for the court system to change its approach
toward juveniles and young offenders, the answer is a qualified
“yes.” Empirical evidence has shown that the macro-level
reforms identified above could result in lower recidivism rates,
improved public health, and substantial financial savings for
state and local governments.221 As discussed earlier, data shows
that involvement in court proceedings leads to a higher school
drop-out rate, heightened risk of continued criminality, and
chronic under- and unemployment.222 With Simmons as
precedent, future litigation affirming that “youth” must be
considered as mitigating and not aggravating could lead to fewer
children being channeled into the court system, resulting in a
223
larger population of educated, skilled workers. Similarly,
litigation grounded in the holding of Graham calling for
meaningful opportunities for release could lead to an
improvement in the quality of mental health and substance abuse
treatment for children and adolescents who are incarcerated.
This could help prevent such conditions from becoming chronic
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and reduce delinquency and recidivism rates among at-risk
populations.224 In addition, government budgets would see
windfalls if fewer young offenders were incarcerated for long
terms of years. In contrast, if the court system fails to augment
resources and improve rehabilitation programs and commitment
facilities for juveniles, it will lose credibility and public
confidence, and state and local economies will continue to incur
significant financial costs. Just as states implemented civil rights
legislation post-Brown only after their funding was threatened,225
economics is likely to be the most salient incentive in the current
climate.
Unlike the post-Gault period, during which there was
intractable judicial resistance and few organizations committed to
juvenile court reform,226 today there are multiple constituencies
and parallel organizations that can work in tandem with the
courts to effect change. They include state legislatures;227
advocacy organizations (non-profit, private, governmental);228
229
legal academics; the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and
224

See Laurie Chassin, Juvenile Justice and Substance Abuse, 18
FUTURE CHILD., 165, 169–71 (2008); Thomas Grisso, Adolescent Offenders
with Mental Disorders, 18 FUTURE CHILD., 143, 150–53 (2008); see also
Michael Vitiello, Addressing the Special Problems of Mentally Ill Prisoners:
A Small Piece of the Solution to Our Nation’s Prison Crisis, 88 DENV. U. L.
REV. 57, 64–65 (2010) (asserting that Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Simmons
and Graham suggest that he will also support mental health policy reform).
225
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
226
See supra notes 132, 137–42 and accompanying text.
227
See, e.g., supra notes 206–10 and accompanying text.
228
See, e.g., Pat Nolan & Jody Kent Lavy, Children Deserve Second
Chances, DAILY KOS (May 24, 2011), http://www.dailykos.com/story/
2011/05/24/979004/-Children-Deserve-Second-Chances?detail=hide&via=
blog_795818 (noting that the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing and Youth
calls for Graham to be extended to felony murder).
229
See, e.g., Anthony Barkow, Op-Ed., Every Child Deserves a Second
Chance, HUFFINGTON POST (May 24, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/anthony-barkow/every-child-deserves-a-se_b_866501.html (calling for
Graham to be extended to every young person convicted of a serious crime);
Jeffrey James Shook, Op-Ed., Pennsylvania Locks Away Too Many Juveniles
Forever, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (May 22, 2011), http://www.postgazette.com/pg/11142/1148022-109-0.stm (calling for Graham to be applied
to homicide crimes); Mark Osler, Op-Ed., Michigan’s Juvenile Crime Laws

60

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Delinquency Prevention;230 and professional organizations such
231
as the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry.
Likewise, litigation that draws an analogy between juvenile court
and mental health commitments to invoke the “right to
treatment” doctrine could result in settlement agreements or
court orders directing state lawmakers to expend funds on
indigent defense services, residential mental health and drug
treatment for adolescents, and so forth.232 In short, while there
Need to Be Revisited, DETROIT NEWS (May 17, 2011), http://detnews.com
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http://www.cwla.org/advocacy/juvenilejustice.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
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(reporting that the ACLU has filed a class-action lawsuit and taken steps to
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are clear limitations to the degree of change that Simmons and
its progeny are likely to generate, the possibilities are endless—
although they are admittedly only possibilities.
VI. CONCLUSION
With states facing staggering budgetary shortfalls and
lawmakers increasingly willing to make deep cuts to the criminal
justice system,233 it is tempting to overstate the significance of
successful Supreme Court litigation, rather than focus on such
intractable matters as the elimination of treatment programs for
young offenders.234 Yet, while legal victories from In re Gault to
J.D.B. v. North Carolina are worthy of being labeled
“landmark,” it is critical to remember that rarely do “rights
235
triumph over politics.” Sustainable policy reform often requires
departing from the status quo, creating new models rather than
merely dismantling old ones, and making short-term investments
in order to reap long-term benefits—none of which is easy or
popular during hard economic and culturally divisive times.
One promising example may be found in the Civil Citation
Initiative in Miami, Florida, a program in which children who
commit minor misdemeanors are referred to targeted intervention
services rather than arrested and exposed to the juvenile justice
system.236 The initiative—developed by a coalition of community
233
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activists, police officers, lawyers, and teachers—has significantly
lowered recidivism rates, and the Miami-Dade community has
seen a thirty percent drop in juvenile arrests.237 As a result, the
program has led to increased public safety and taxpayer savings
238
and has been identified as a national model. With this lesson in
mind, proponents of significant social reform must continue to
focus their attention on legislatures and, perhaps most
importantly, on political action.239 As Gerald Rosenberg has
stated, “[p]olitical organizing, political mobilization, and voter
registration may not be glamorous . . . but they are the best if not
the only hope to produce change—not as a fallback position, not
as a complement to a legal strategy, but as the strategy itself.”240
In this way, with litigators working in tandem with both
lawmakers and activists, the hope for juvenile justice reform in
the twenty-first century will not be hollow.
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